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Abstract:
Purpose: This study explores the effective regulation of  institutional investor's encroachment
behavior in stock market. Given the theoretical and practical importance, the present study
examines the effect of  the self-adaptive regulation strategy (adjusting the regulation factors
such as punishment and the probability of  investigating successfully in time) for the sake of
the small & medium-sized investor protection. 
Design/methodology/approach: This study was carried out through game theory and
agent-based modeling simulation.  Firstly, a dynamic game model was built to search the core
factors of  regulation and the equilibrium paths. Secondly, an agent-based modeling simulation
model was built in Swarm to extend the game model. Finally, a simulation experiment (using
virtual parameter values) was performed to examine the effect of  regulation strategy obtained
form game model. 
Findings: The results of  this study showed that the core factors of  avoiding the institutional
investor's encroachment behavior are the punishment and the probability of  investigating
successfully of  the regulator. The core factors embody as the self-adaptability and the capability
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of  regulator. If  the regulator can adjust the regulation factors in time, the illegal behaviors will
be avoided effectively.
Research limitations/implications: The simulation experiment in this paper was performed
with virtual parameter values. Although the results of  experiment showed the effect of  self-
adaptive regulation, there are still some differences between simulation experiment and real
market situation.
Originality/value: The purpose of  this study is to investigate an effective regulation strategy
of  institutional investor's encroachment behavior in stock market in order to maintain market
order and protect the benefits of  investors. Base on the game model and simulation model, a
simulation experiment was preformed and the result showed that the self-adaptive regulation
would be effective. This study applied game theory and agent-based modeling simulation to the
research of  financial regulation, and extended the application field of  these two methods.
Keywords: institutional investor, agent-based modeling, simulation, regulation, self-adaptability
1. Introduction
Stock market is the most important and active component part of investment market in one
country. There are several kinks of investors trading in stock market in order to make a profit,
institutional investors and small & medium-sized investors are the two important kinds of
market participants. Although institutional investors are few in number, they are powerful
enough to affect the price movements of one or several stocks through stock trading or
affecting the listed companies' operation; small & medium-sized investors are numerous, but
they are always the price takers of stock. Based on the properties of institutional investors,
they can encroach on the small & medium-sized investors' benefits easily. For the sake of
investors' benefits especially the small & medium-sized investors', the regulator of stock
market is searching the scientific regulation strategies. 
This paper studies the regulation strategies for one kind of illegal behavior which is the
encroachment on small & medium-sized investors' benefits carried out by institutional investor
through game theory and agent-based modeling simulation. Firstly, a dynamic game model is
built to analyze the equilibrium paths and the relationship among the institutional investor,
small & medium-sized investors and the regulator. Secondly, an agent-based modeling
simulation model is built in order to test the results of game analysis. Finally, we propose a
self-adaptive regulation strategy to avoid the encroachment behavior on small & medium-sized
investors.
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2. Literature review
Today, financial security has become a key problem for every country. Other studies have been
mainly focus on the laws and ignored the behavioral features of the participants in financial
market. As the computer science has been highly developed, the researcher may build virtual
financial system to research the participants and the system evolution in computer
environment. Since then, the simulation is becoming an effective method for financial security
and policy research. Bruun and Luna (1999) built an agent-based modeling simulation model
for simulating the macro-economical operation in Swarm environment and research the
behavioral features of macro-economical participants. And their model proved that the
simulation model could simulate the reality quite well. Luna and Stefannson (2001) compiled
an academic monograph based on a series of simulation researches and discussed the
feasibility of simulation method for financial research. And they explained how to program the
simulation model in Swarm environment, which makes their monograph be an important
reference for agent-based modeling simulation research. Foster (2005) investigated the
complex system in depth and proposed that the complex system research should consider the
relationship among the participants. Foster's research required the genetic algorithm to endow
simulation agents with self-adaptability in order to make the simulation model be close to the
reality as far as possible. Ren (2006) investigated the regulation of insurance market through
game theory and agent-based modeling simulation in Swarm. The simulation experiments
showed that the regulator can control the illegal behaviors through controlling the key
parameters of insurance applicants. Liu and Han (2007) established a multi-agent artificial
stock market in order to study the characteristic of investment behavior of investors. The
simulation experiments showed that the investors would choose the stock for maximizing
investment revenue based on their wealth and investment experiences. Liu, Zhang and He
(2008) proposed a multi-agent simulation framework based on finite automaton for studying
the bounded rationality behaviors of economic agents. This simulation framework could carry
out the simulation of sequential game and evolutionary game. A series simulation experiments
for repeated prisoners' dilemma with three players were carried out, which verified the
availability of the multi-agent simulation framework. Tedeschi, Iori and Gallegati (2009)
studied the market effect of the exchange of information among investors and investment
behaviors imitation in their simulation model. Their research brought new ideas for simulating
the behaviors of investors and the information flows. Liu (2010) analyzed the possibility of the
institutional investors' conspiring to control some new stock in Chinese stock market based on
game theory and simulation model. An agent-based simulation model in Swarm was built to
research the investment behaviors of institutional investors and the regulation of the illegal
phenomenon. Some scientific measures to avoid the conspiring control on the new stock were
proposed based on the game and simulation analysis. Liu and Wang (2011) studied the
regulation of institutional investors encroaching on small and medium- sized investors' benefit
in stock market through establishing a static game model and its simulation model in Swarm.
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Severe beforehand- regulation, faultless company management and smarter regulator would
avoid the encroaching of institutional investors based on the game analysis and simulation
experiments.
The following game and simulation analysis are based upon the previous research results.
3. Game analysis
3.1. Description of the game
Because the institutional investor has plenty of capital, so he can own most of circulation
stocks of one listed company, which creates the condition for him to control the company and
its wealth. In this paper we assume that the institutional investor will encroach on the small &
medium-sized investors' benefits through encroaching on the wealth of the listed company. To
avoid this kind of illegal behavior, the regulator of stock market should take necessary
measures. From the description of the game, we know that there are three kinds of players
involved in the game, which are institutional investor, small & medium-sized investors and
regulator. 
The game has three steps. Firstly, the institutional investor chooses to encroach or not to. If
the institutional investor decides to encroach on the wealth of listed company, he will own "a"
percents of the total circulation stocks and encroach on ratio "B" of listed company's wealth
"W"; and the institutional investor will take cost "Ce" to do this. If institutional investor chooses
not to encroach, nothing happens. The second step of the game is in small & medium-sized
investors' turn. The small & medium-sized investors will choose to complain or not to complain
when their benefits are encroached on. If the small & medium-sized investors choose not to
complain, they will lose "(1-a) •B•W" which will be the illegal profit of the institutional
investor; if they do complain they will pay "Cp" as the cost and the game will enter the third
step. In the third step of the game, the regulator will choose to investigate or not to. If the
regulator chooses to investigate the encroachment behavior, he will pay "CR" as the cost. If the
regulator investigates the illegal behavior successfully, the institutional investor will face
punishment "N", compensation "PF" and encroaching income "(1-a) •B•W" given back to small
& medium-sized investors; and the regulator will gain "U" including good reputation and so on.
If the regulator investigates unsuccessfully or chooses not to investigate, the institutional
investor will get away with murder and the small & medium-sized investors will bear the loss,
and the regulator will get bad reputation "-U" as its negligence of duty simultaneously. In
conclusion, this is a dynamic game with complete information and the game tree is shown as
Figure 1.
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Figure 1. The structure of the game
In the game tree described in Figure 1, player 1 stands for institutional investor; player 2
stands for the small & medium-sized investors; player 3 stands for the market regulator;
player 0 is the virtual player "Nature" who will decide the probability of investigating
successfully or failed.
3.2. Equilibrium paths of the game
From the description and game tree, we have known that it is a dynamic game with complete
information, and backward induction method is the effective measure for solving the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium.
Firstly, we start from the third step of the game, which is the regulator's decision. The better
result for the market and small & medium-sized investors is that the regulator chooses to
investigate the encroachment behavior. The necessary condition of investigating is the profits
regulator gained when he investigates bigger than he does not. IF the virtual player "Nature"
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sets the probability of investigating successfully or failed as "(Ps, 1-Ps)", the condition will be
shown as formula (1).
Ps•·(U-CR)+(1-Ps)•(-U-CR)>-U (1)
Secondly, we go back to the second step of the game, which is the small & medium-sized
investors' decision. The better result for the stock market is that the small & medium-sized
investors choose to complain. The necessary condition of this result is the profits small &
medium-sized investors gained when they complain bigger than they do not; the condition will
be shown as formula (2).
Ps•(PF-Cp)+(1-Ps)•[-(1-a)•B•W-Cp]> -(1-a)•B•W (2)
Finally, we go back to the first step of the game, which is the institutional investor's decision.
When the condition shown as formula (3) is satisfied, the institutional investor will choose to
encroach on.
Ps•(-N-PF-Ce)+(1-Ps)•[(1-a)•B•W-Ce]>0 (3)
On the contrary, the institutional investor will choose not to encroach on the small & medium-
sized investors' benefits; the condition is shown as formula (4).
Ps•(-N-PF-Ce)+(1-Ps)•[(1-a)•B•W-Ce]<0 (4)
To sum up the solution, we acquire two equilibrium paths, one is "(To encroach, Complain,
Investigate)" and the other is "(Not to encroach)". From formula (1) to formula (4), we know
that there are three key factors which are "Ps", "N" and "PF". Factor "Ps" reflects the capability
of regulator, "N" stands for the punishment given to the institutional investor from regulator,
and "PF" which stands for the compensation for small & medium-sized investors. And we can
deduce that the three regulation factors are the bigger the better. When the three regulation
factors are big enough, the best equilibrium path that "(Not to encroach)" will be achieved.
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Based on the game analysis, we will build a dynamic agent-based modeling simulation model
in Swarm environment in order to test the results of game analysis and propose the self-
adaptive regulation strategy.
4. Agent-based modeling simulation model in Swarm
4.1. Agents of the simulation model
There are two kinds of agents in the simulation model of Swarm, one kind is simulation agent
and the other kind is functional agent. The simulation agent is the mapping of game player.
The functional agent is invisible in game model but it will endow the simulation agent with
extra attributes. Based on the game model discussed above, there are three simulation agents
who are institutional investor (Iinvestor), small & medium-sized investors (MSinvestor) and
regulator (Regulator) in the simulation model. In addition, the simulation model has one
functional agent which is Genetic Algorithm Learning Classifier System (GALCS). The function
of GALCS is to endow the simulation agents with self-adaptability.
As the simulation model is the extension of game model and the simulation agents are the
mappings of game players, the simulation agents should have the properties and actions as
they have in game model. The main properties and actions of simulation agents are described
in Table1 and Table 2.
Agent Property Variable in simulationmodel
Iinvestor
The encroachment ratio B
The profit of current simulation cycle profit
The profit of last simulation cycle lastprofit
Regulator
The probability of investigating successfully PS
The punishment index N
The profit of current simulation cycle profit
The profit of last simulation cycle lastprofit
MSinvestor
The profit of current simulation cycle profit
The profit of last simulation cycle lastprofit
Public information Wealth
Table 1. The main properties of the simulation agents
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Agent Action Function description Action type
Iinvestor
-encroach Deciding the change of the encroachment ratio Baccording to the regulation situation Simulation action
-compare
Computing the profit in current simulation cycle





Deciding the change of the probability of
investigating successfully PS according to the
illegal situation
Simulation action
-setN Deciding the change of the punishment index Naccording to the illegal situation Simulation action
-compare
Computing the profit in current simulation cycle
and providing evidence for modifying strategy in
the next cycle
Simulation action
MSinvestor -compute Computing the expect profit Simulation action-get Getting the public informations Functional action
Table 2. The main actions of the simulation agents
4.2. Genetic Algorithm Learning Classifier System
Genetic Algorithm Learning Classifier System (GALCS) is a very important agent in the
simulation model. Different from one time game, the dynamic simulation will run the game
process repeatedly as the market realities. In the real stock market, the participants will
optimize their decisions in real time. In order to make the simulation model conform to the
market realities as far as possible, the simulation agents need self-adaptability to adjust their
decisions. GALCS is the functional agent which will endow the simulation agents with self-
adaptability. The GALCS will accumulate the probability of optimal decision when the simulation
agents face the same situation as before. In this simulation model, institutional investor agent
(Iinvestor) and regulator agent (Regulator) are endowed with self-adaptability by GALCS. 
The GALCS of institutional investor agent (Iinvestor) uses the probability of successful
investigation "Ps" and punishment from regulator "N" as the adjustment coefficients, which
both have three statuses including rising, flatting and declining. So the institutional investor
agent will face 3×3=9 different situations. The institutional investor will adjust his GALCS
according to his profit changing, when his profit rises he will increase the cumulative
probability of the current decision, on the contrary, he will decrease the cumulative probability
of the current decision if he faces the same situation in the future. The GALCS of regulator
agent (Regulator) uses the encroachment ratio "B" and the profit of institutional investor agent
as the adjustment coefficients, which also both have three statuses, and the regulator agent
will face 9 different situations too. Same as the GALCS of institutional investor, the regulator
agent will optimize his decision according to his own profit changing. By doing so, the
institutional investor agent and regulator agent will optimize their decisions according to the
situation, and we can research how the equilibrium paths generate and the effect of self-
adaptive regulation strategy.
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4.3. Environment of the simulation model
According to the relationship among the simulation agents and functional agent, the
environment of the simulation model may be described as Figure 2. In Figure 2, Iinvestor and
Regulator are the mapping of game players; the GALCS is the functional agent who endows the
simulation agents with self-adaptability. ModelSwarm is a functional agent to control the
simulation process in Swarm.
Figure 2. The environment of the simulation model
4.4. The action sequence of the simulation agents
The last work of building a simulation model is to define the action sequence of the simulation
agents in one simulation cycle. There are seven steps in this simulation model. The simulation
process and information flows are shown as Figure 3.
The first step: The institutional investor agent (Iinvestor) performs his action named
"-encroach" to decide the change of the encroachment ratio "B" according to the regulation
situation.
The second step: The small & medium-sized investors agent (MSinvestor) performs his action
named "-compute" to compute the expect profit he will gain or lose.
The third step: The regulator agent (Regulator) performs his action named "-setPS" to decide
the change of the probability of investigating successfully "Ps" according to the illegal situation.
The fourth step: The regulator agent (Regulator) performs his action named "-setN" to decide
the change of the punishment index "N" according to the illegal situation.
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Figure 3. The process and information flows of the simulation model
The fifth step: The institutional investor agent (Iinvestor) performs his action named "-
compare" to compute the profit in current simulation cycle and provide evidence for modifying
encroachment strategy in next cycle.
The sixth step: The regulator agent (Regulator) performs his action named "-compare" to
compute the profit in current simulation cycle and provide evidence for modifying regulation
strategy in next cycle.
The seventh step: One whole simulation cycle is over; the simulation process will go back to
the first step.
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4.5. Simulation experiment
After running the simulation model, a dialog box shown as Figure 4 for parameters initialization
will be shown to us.
Figure 4. The dialog box for parameters initialization
There are nine parameters as the mapping of game model need to be initialized including the
wealth of the listed company "wealth"; the ratio of the circulation stock institutional investor
held "a"; the cost for the encroachment behavior of institutional investor "coste"; the
probability of investigating successfully of regulator "PS"; the punishment index for the
institutional investor "N"; the compensation for the small & medium-sized investors "PF"; the
cost of complaining for the small & medium-sized investors "costP"; the utility as good
reputation gained by regulator when investigating successfully "regulationU". These nine
parameters will be initialized as 100000, 0.3, 1000, 0, 0, 500, 1000, 1000 and 1000. The
initial values of parameters are all the virtual values, and using virtual values will not affect the
research. The simulation experiment will proceed in two phases, one phase will run the
simulation model with no regulation, and the other phase will run the simulation model with
self-adaptive regulation strategy. We will research the decision properties of institutional
investor in order to investigate the effect of self-adaptive regulation strategy.
The first experiment phase is the situation that the regulator has no regulation strategy
against the encroachment behavior, and the result is shown in Figure 5. When the regulator
has no regulation strategy, the encroachment ratio "B" of institutional investor will increase
rapidly and the ratio "B" will keep in 100% after some time. The result means that the
institutional investor will do his illegal behavior unscrupulously and the listed company and the
small & medium-sized investors will lose lots of wealth at the same time. In order to protect
the benefits of small & medium-sized investors and maintain the market order, the effective
regulation strategy is necessary.
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Figure 5. The change of encroachment ratio B without regulation
The second experiment phase is the situation that the regulator uses the self-adaptive
regulation strategy. The main character of the self-adaptive regulation is the regulator can
adjust his regulation factors which are "PS" and "N" timely according to the situation. The
simulation result is shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6. The change of encroachment ratio B with self-adaptive regulation
As the regulator has self-adaptability, he will adjust his regulation factors timely according to
the institutional investor's decision; and the institutional investor will adjust his encroachment
strategy according to the regulation situation. At the beginning, we see that when the
regulation is not strictly, the institutional investor will encroach on the wealth by a high ratio
"B". In order to avoid the bad reputation and profit loss, the regulator will strengthen the
regulation by increase his capability "PS" and the punishment index "N" timely. By doing so,
the institutional investor will face great loss and the only way to avoid this is to decrease the
encroachment ratio until reduced to zero. When the encroachment ratio "B" drops to zero, the
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best game equilibrium path that "(Not to encroach)" will be achieved, and the institutional
investor will not do the illegal behavior.
5. Conclusion
From the discussion above, it's not hard to see that the game analysis is a kind of one time
analysis of strategies, but the simulation model based on the game model is a dynamic and
repeated process of the game. So the simulation model will show the adjustment of players or
agents' strategies and how the equilibrium paths generate. In game analysis, we know that the
probability of investigating successfully "Ps" which reflects the capability of regulator, the
punishment "N", and the compensation for small & medium-sized investors "PF" are the key
regulation factors of avoiding the encroaching performed by the institutional investor. The
bigger the three factors are the more likely to avoid the illegal behavior carried out by
institutional investor. According to market realities and game model, we use a functional agent
named GALCS to endow the players with self-adaptability which makes the investors and
regulator agents optimize their strategies timely. In the simulation model, we know that the
best regulation strategy for regulator is his self-adaptation. In order to increase the profit, the
regulator must improve his capability which reflected as "Ps" and adjust the punishment "N".
When the regulator has a high "Ps" and "N", the institutional investor will choose not to
encroach on the benefits of small & medium-sized investors, and the best equilibrium path will
be achieved.
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